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When Politics and Models Collide: 
Estimating Models of Multiparty Elections* 
R. Michael Alvarez, California Institute of Technology 
Jonathan Nagler, University of California, Riverside 
Theory: The spatial model of elections can better be represented by using conditional 
logit models which consider the position of the parties in issue spaces than by multino­
mial lo git models which only consider the position of voters in the issue space. The spa­
tial model, and random utility models in general, suffer from a failure to adequately con­
sider the substitutability of parties sharing similar or identical issue positions. 
Hypotheses: Multinomial logit is not necessarily better than successive applications of bi­
nomial logit. Conditional logit allows for considering more interesting political questions 
than does multinomial logit. The spatial model may not correspond to voter decision­
making in multiple party settings. Multinomial probit allows for a relaxation of the IIA 
condition and this should improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties .  
Methods: Comparisons of binomial logit, multinomial logit, conditional logit, and multi­
nomial probit on simulated data and survey data from multiparty elections. 
Results: Multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit. Conditional 
logit is capable of examining movements by parties, whereas multinomial logit is not. 
Multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit when considering the effects of 
altering the set of choices available to voters. Estimation of multinomial probit with more 
than three choices is feasible. 
1. The Theory and the Practice of Issue Voting Models 
The spatial model of voting has been a dominant paradigm in the voting 
literature over the past 25 years (Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1 970; 
Downs 1 957; Enelow and Hinich 1 984), supplanting the "funnel of causal­
ity" (Campbell et al., 1 960) which had a brief reign beginning around 1 960. 
*This is one of many joint papers by the authors on multiparty elections, the ordering of their names 
reflects alphabetic convention. Earlier versions of this research were presented at the Annual Meet­
ings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 1 995 and at the Annual 
Political Methodology Summer Conference, Indianapolis, July, 1 995 .  We thank John Aldrich, 
Nathaniel Beck, Simon Jackman, John Jackson, Jonathan Katz, Gary King, Dean Lacy, Eric 
Lawrence, Jan Leighley, Will Moore, Mitch Sanders, and Guy Whitten for their comments on earlier 
versions of this research, and Methodology Conference participants for their input. We also thank 
participants of the Southern California Political Economy Group for their discussion of this research 
on November 17 ,  1 995 at the University of California-Irvine, and participants in the Second CIC 
Interactive Video Methods Seminar which was broadcast from the University of Minnesota on Oc­
tober 25, 1 996. Alvarez thanks the John M. Olin Foundation for support of his research. Nagler 
thanks the NSF for grant SBR-94 1 3939. Comments may be directed to the authors at: DHSS 228-
77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Ca 9 1 125, Internet: rma@crunch.caltech.edu; and 
Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, CA 9252 1-0 1 1 8, Internet: 
nagler@wizard.ucr.edu, respectively. 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 1 ,  January 1 998,  Pp. 55-96 © 1 998 by the 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System 
56 R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler 
The spatial model is scientifically appealing because of its elegance. It is 
easy to state: a person votes for the party nearest to him or her on the issues. 
Furthermore, the spatial model is intuitively appealing to those political sci­
entists who believe that politics is about policy-it states succinctly that is­
sues matter. 
Most quantitative analyses of elections based on the spatial model have 
involved two-party elections; however most elections involve more than two 
candidates or parties. Elections dominated by two parties are the rule in the 
United States, but not the rest of the world. In this paper we clarify the meth­
odological implications of using the spatial model to understand multi­
candidate or multiparty elections and we seek to correct some common and 
widespread misconceptions about the discrete choice models which are best 
suited for studying multicandidate or multiparty elections. We first demon­
strate that two simple econometric techniques commonly used in the litera­
ture, binomial logit and multinomial logit, produce almost identical esti­
mates. Multinomial logit is a model of only pairwise comparisons and the 
only real difference between the two techniques is that multinomial logit 
produces more efficient estimates (i.e., all other things being equal, multino­
mial logit estimates will converge to the true model parameters more 
quickly than will binomial logit estimates) since it uses more sample infor­
mation than binomial logit. 
We then demonstrate, however, that multinomial logit is a very limited 
technique since it represents a very limited substantive view of politics. The 
multinomial logit model includes only information about the individual vot­
ers, but does not include the issue positions of the parties and the candidates. 
Since issue positions of parties and candidates are fundamental to both the 
spatial theory and our intuitions about the political world, multinomial logit 
is not the most useful discrete choice model. 
We argue that in most electoral settings multinomial logit is likely to 
represent the wrong model. We strongly advocate conditional logit as an al­
ternative to multinomial logit for estimating models of elections. Condi­
tional logit is "conditional on the characteristics of the choices"; thus it ex­
plicitly allows for measures of party characteristics. At a minimum, the 
spatial model requires conditional logit since the spatial model is based on 
positions of voters relative to parties. Thus, if you care about questions of 
strategy of candidates or parties, you should at least use conditional logit. 1 
1We use the term "conditional logit" to encompass models that combine both choice-specific 
and individual-specific variables. We use the following terminology throughout the paper. We refer 
to a logit model where the dependent variable can take more than two values and the independent 
variables are individual-specific as multinomial logit; it may be referred to elsewhere as polychoto­
mous logit. Our use is consistent with Maddala's (1983) use of this term. This should not be con­
fused with conditional logit, as developed by McFadden (1974). Conditional logit is defined as a 
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The conditional logit estimator is available for use in many econometrics 
packages and is no less robust or harder to estimate than multinomial lo git. 2 
We are simply making the argument that conditional logit is a better match 
than multinomial logit for common political science theories of elections. 
Conditional logit is capable of answering theoretical questions that multino­
mial logit estimates cannot. This should be a critical criteria in choosing an 
estimator. 
This raises an important question: what are the methodological implica­
tions of using the spatial model to specify empirical models of multican­
didate or multiparty elections? Unfortunately, moving from a two candidate 
to a multicandidate setting suggests a problem for both the spatial model and 
most common econometric choice models, since the spatial model and all 
commonly used discrete choice models impose the property of indepen­
dence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) on individual voters. IIA implies that 
the ratio of the probability of choosing one party to the probability of choos­
ing a second party is unchanged for individual voters if a third party enters 
the race. In simple terms, this implies that in a contest between a liberal and 
a conservative party, the entry of a second conservative party would not al­
ter the relative probability of an individual voter choosing between the two 
initial parties. However, because the two conservative parties are close to­
gether in the issue space and hence are likely to be viewed as substitutes by 
voters, our intuition suggests that these relative probabilities will change. 
There are at least three reasons to search for a model that does not im­
pose the IIA condition. First, assuming IIA could lead to incorrect estimates 
of the model parameters. Second, assuming IIA to be true when it is not will 
be particularly troubling with regards to one of the more interesting ques­
tions regarding multiparty elections: what happens when one party is re­
moved from the choice set? If IIA is violated, then the voters who had been 
choosing a removed alternative may shift their votes in an unanticipated 
manner. Third, we would like some substantive insight into the choice pro­
cess used by individuals, but imposing the IIA condition on voters implies 
logit model where the dependent variable takes more than two values and the independent variables 
are choice-specific. An additional complexity emerges when we consider a logit model which in­
cludes both individual- and choice-specific independent variables: this we consider a generalization 
of the conditional logit model and we will also call these conditional lo git models. Later in the pa­
per, we turn to a probit model with both individual- and choice-specific variables. To maintain con­
sistency with most existing literature, we will call this the multinomial probit model. Hausman and 
Wise (1978) use the term conditional probit; but Maddala (1983), Amemiya (1985), and Greene 
(1993) in subsequent texts have consistently used the term multinomial probit. 
2Conditional logit estimates presented here were computed with SST. Limdep and Stata are 
other commonly used packages which allow for estimation of the conditional logit model. Estimates 
for appropriate syntax in these packages and the data for this article can be obtained from the ICPSR 
article replication archive. 
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that we are starting our research with a very restrictive assumption about 
that process. 
Unfortunately, both conditional logit and multinomial logit suffer from 
the limitation that they assume IIA. The final point we make in this paper is 
that there are models available (multinomial probit and the general ex­
treme-value models) which do not impose IIA. However, they avoid im­
posing IIA through the disturbance term rather than the systemic compo­
nent. While this may not be an entirely satisfactory approach to resolving 
the IIA problem in models of voting decisions, it is better than ignoring the 
problem of IIA. 
We begin by describing multinomial logit and show that it is the same as 
successive applications of binomial logit. We then describe conditional lo git 
and illustrate its advantages over multinomial logit by demonstrating that we 
can measure the impact of changes in party issue positions on aggregate 
vote-shares: a task which is impossible with multinomial logit. We then de­
scribe why a general class of models will impose IIA. Last we provide esti­
mates using multinomial probit, a model which does not impose IIA, show­
ing that IIA is indeed violated in examples taken from recent elections in 
both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 
2. Logit Models 
We begin with a discussion of two logit models which have been used 
widely in economics, but more sparingly in political science. The first model 
we consider is multinomial logit, which is characterized by a systemic com­
ponent that is a linear function of characteristics of the individual, as op­
posed to characteristics of the alternative (i.e., of the party). The second 
model we consider is the conditional logit model, which allows for choice­
specific independent variables measuring characteristics of each party. We 
also discuss the common assumptions these two logit models make about 
the distribution of the disturbances. We characterize the basic properties of 
several discrete choice models in Table 1 .  
Table 1 shows that multinomial logit is the most restrictive discrete 
choice model we discuss in this paper: it models the choice probabilities as 
functions only of characteristics of the individual voter, it does not allow the 
error terms to be correlated across choices, and it provides few answers to 
important political questions. Conditional logit, however, is less restrictive 
since it allows the choice probabilities to be functions of the characteristics 
of both the individual and the alternatives. Conditional logit does not allow 
for correlations between the errors. Both the generalized extreme-value 
model and the multinomial probit model allow for choice-specific right­
hand side variables, for the relaxation of the assumption of independent er­
ror terms, and can shed light on what might happen were parties to move in 
the issue space or drop out of elections. The generalized extreme-value 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Discrete Choice Models 
Generalized 
Multinomial Conditional Extreme- Multinomial 
Logit Logit Value Pro bit 
Alternative Specific Values No Yes Yes Yes 
Correlated Disturbances No No Some Yes 
Includes Position of Party No Yes Yes Yes 
Can Correctly Measure 
Movement by Parties No Yes Yes Yes 
Assumes IIA Yes Yes No No 
Can Correctly Measure 
Omission of a Party No No Sometimes Yes 
model is more limited than the multinomial probit model since the former 
allows only for a more restricted set of error correlations. In the following 
sections of the paper we discuss each model in more detail. 
2.1 Multinomial Logit 
Multinomial lo git specifies the i th individual's utility of the j th choice as: 
where X; is a vector of characteristics of the i th individual. Note that this 
model estimates a set of coefficients for each choice: /3j is subscripted based 
on the alternatives. For one of the choices the coefficients are normalized to 
be zero. 
The probabilities of the i th indiviqual choosing the j th alternative from a 
set of J alternatives are given by: ·0 





Equation [3] implies that the ratio of the probabilities of choosing alternative 
j to alternative k for individual i is independent of the probability of choos­
ing the other alternatives. This is the IIA property. 
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The first point we emphasize about multinomial logit is that each set of 
coefficients are identical to the coefficients of a binomial logit model using 
only individuals who choose either alternative j or k, and ignoring all other 
individuals. This is a key part of the multinomial logit model: it is identical 
to comparing two choices and ignoring all the other choices. Thus if an "ig­
nored" choice affects the relative probabilities of choosing the two included 
choices differently, then the model will perform badly. An important corol­
lary to this is that multinomial logit cannot produce richer empirical models 
of politics than binomial logit, since they are equivalent models. We demon­
strate that multinomial and binomial logit are equivalent using three differ­
ent approaches: 1 )  we describe the econometric intuition for what the two 
models are actually estimating; 2) we offer binomial logit and multinomial 
logit estimates from survey data; and 3) we offer a simulation demonstrating 
that multinomial logit and binomial logit yield equivalent results. 
2.2 Multinomial Lo git Is Equivalent to Binomial Lo git 
To see that multinomial logit and binomial logit are estimating the exact 
same thing we need to first describe in some detail the underlying assump­
tions which provide the foundation for both models. Multinomial logit and 
binomial logit both produce estimates of parameters of a random utility 
model.3 Random utility models assume that while individuals maximize 
their expected utility, these utilities are not known to researchers and must 
be assumed to be random variables. This allows us to assume that utility can 
be partitioned into an observed or systemic component, and an unobserved 
or random component. Consider such a model: 
Uil = f31Xi + uil 
Ui2 = f32Xi + ui2 
ui3 = AXi + ui3 
Here U iJ represents the utility to the i th individual for the j th party, and Xi 
is measuring characteristics of the i th voter. f3j represents a parameter vector 
determining the contribution of voter characteristics to utility for choice j. In 
3There are at least three ways in which discrete choice models can be motivated: from a ran­
dom utility maximization framework, from a direct probabilistic model, or from threshold models 
(King 1989). In this paper we concentrate on the random utility maximization approach, since we 
feel that it produces a clear linkage between the theories of individual political choice which we are 
testing in our work and the statistical models we wish to specify and estimate. Space does not per­
mit us to motivate all of the statistical models we discuss in this paper in each of these three differ­
ent ways. Instead, we refer the reader to King's excellent discussion of these alternative motivations 
for binary choice models (1989, 98-115). 
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both multinomial logit and binomial logit one parameter is normalized to 
zero. Thus, when estimating binomial logit only one set of coefficients is 
produced since the other set has been normalized to zero and never appears. 
In this case, say {33 is normalized to zero. Then if choice 1 is omitted, bino­
mial logit will generate consistent estimates of /32 using only individuals 
who pick choice 2 or choice 3. Omitting choice 2, binomial logit will gener­
ate consistent estimates of /31. 
A common point of confusion is the claim that binomial logit will not 
produce consistent estimates because it ignores the presence of a third 
choice. However, if IIA holds (which both binomial logit and multinomial 
logit posit), then this has no effect: binomial logit will produce consistent es­
timates of the parameters because the maintained model implies that the 
presence or absence of the third choice has no impact on the relative prob­
abilities of choosing either of the other two choices. Of course there is a loss 
of efficiency because some information is discarded. But binomial logit still 
produces consistent estimates of the true model parameters, a point proven 
by Hausman and McFadden in their article describing a test for IIA ( 1984, 
1 222-23). 
Now consider estimating the above model with multinomial logit. 
Again, we normalize {33 to 0. Now multinomial logit gives us consistent es­
timates of the true parameters /31 and {32; consistent estimates of the exact 
same parameters we estimated with binomial logit! This is the central point: 
once IIA is assumed, binomial and multinomial logit produce estimates of 
the same parameters. Thus using multinomial logit rather than binomial logit 
does not give estimates of a richer model positing a complex three-party 
choice process. 
That binary logit and multinomial logit are estimating essentially the 
same coefficients is an existing result in both the statistical and econometric 
literature; this point was discussed by Amemiya (1 976) and demonstrated by 
Hausman and McFadden ( 1 984).4 Unfortunately, these points are missed by 
most analyses in the political science literature. In one recent example, 
· Whitten and Palmer ( 1 996) urge empirical researchers examining multiparty 
elections to use multinomial logit instead of binomial logit, based on their 
4The fact that binary logit and multinomial logit consistently estimate the same coefficients 
was exploited by Hausman and McFadden (1984) in their derivation of their statistical test for the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Under the assumption that the multinomial logit model is 
correctly specified, consistent estimates of the same subvector of parameters can be obtained from 
both a multinomial logit model estimated with a full choice set and from another multinomial logit 
or binary logit model estimated with a restricted choice set (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). Thus, if 
we have a three choice problem and the model was correctly specified, both multinomial logit on the 
full choice set and binary lo git on each restricted choice set (each pair of choices) would yield con­
sistent estimates of the same model parameters (Hausman and McFadden 1984). 
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comparison of the two techniques in data taken from British and Dutch elec­
tions: "Comparisons of the parameter estimates produced by each procedure 
and the substantive inferences derived from those estimates demonstrate the 
superiority of multinomial logit over BNL (binomial logit) as a means of 
modeling multiparty vote choice" ( 1 996, 236). Whitten and Palmer reach 
this conclusion by comparing two fundamentally different specifications of 
the dependent variable of their models. The binomial choice models they es­
timate examine the probability of voting for one party, relative to the re­
maining two major parties (the Conservatives in the 1 987 U.K. election rela­
tive to Labour and the Alliance). Their multinomial logit models examine 
the likelihood of voting for one party from a pair of parties (Conservatives 
vs. Labour and the Alliance vs. Labour). Had they estimated successive bi­
nomial models for Conservative versus Labour and then Alliance versus 
Labour, no doubt Whitten and Palmer would have noticed the equivalence 
of the estimated effects of these models. Whitten and Palmer are essentially 
comparing estimates across models with completely different dependent 
variables. That the results differ is no surprise. But it should be looked at as 
a symptom of measurement error on the dependent variable (incorrectly 
recoding a trichotomous variable as a dichotomous variable), not as evi­
dence that multinomial logit estimates contain information that binomial 
logit estimates do not. 
2.3 Equivalence of Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit-An Example 
That multinomial logit and binomial logit simply reproduce coefficients 
representing the same pairwise comparisons of choices can be shown in ac­
tual data from multiparty elections. Here we focus on data taken from the 
1 987 British general election survey (Heath 1 989). 5 The specification of the 
models we estimate is identical to that used by Alvarez, Bowler, and Nagler 
( 1 996). The model specification highlights the importance of issues, eco­
nomic factors, and party politics, and departs in important ways from other 
models of British elections. We include a series of seven issue placement 
variables (defense spending, position on the "phillips curve," taxation, na­
tionalization of industries, redistribution of wealth, crime, and welfare) as 
well as the voter's beliefs about recent changes in national inflation, unem­
ployment, and taxation. To control for factors cited in other works on British 
elections, we include variables which control for region, class, and other de­
mographic effects. 
In Table 2 we present estimates of this model specification modified for 
multinomial logit and binomial logit. The issue positions are operationalized 
5The British Election Study, 1987, was collected by A. Heath, R. Jowell, J .K. Curtice, and So­
cial and Community Planning Research. The data is distributed by the ESRC Data Archive and the 
ICPSR. 
Table 2. Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit Estimates 
British Election-1987 
Conservative/ Alliance Labour/ Alliance 
MNL BL MNL BL 
Intercept -4.33* -4.40* 4.55* 5.26 
(.74) (.76) (.81 (.86) 
Defense .14* .17* -.17* -.19* 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Phillips Curve .08* .10* -.03 -.05 
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Taxation .13* .14* -.06* -.08* 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) 
Nationalization .16* .16* -.16* -.20* 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Redistribution .07* .06* -.08* -.09* 
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) 
Crime .08* .08* .02 .02 
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) 
Welfare .11 * .12* -.11 * -.10* 
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) 
South -.12 -.06 -.41 * -.45* 
(.16) (.17) (.21) (.22) 
Midlands -.26 -.26 -.12 -.15 
(.17) (.17) (.21) (.21) 
North -.03 .03 .66* .61* 
(.17) (.18) (.19) (.20) 
Wales -.40 -.41 1.41 * 1.46* 
(.35) (.36) (.31) (.33) 
Scotland -.36 -.42** .68* .61 * 
(.25) (.26) (.25) (.26) 
Union Member -.50 -.49* .37* .35* 
(.16) (.16) (.16) (.17) 
Public Sector Employee .04 .03 -.05 .03 
(.15) (.15) (.16) (.16) 
Blue Collar .09 .14 .70* .80* 
(.15) (.16) (.17) (.17) 
Gender .29* .33* .04 -.03 
(.14) (.14) (.15) (.16) 
Age .03 .03 -.21* -.24* 
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) 
Homeowner .31 ** .26 -.55* -.52* 
(.18) (.18) (.17) (.17) 
Income .07* .07* -.05 -.07* 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
Education -.81 * -.92* -.54 -.65** 
(.31) (.31) (.35) (.36) 
Inflation .28* .31* -.00 .05 
(.10) (.11) (.12) (.12) 
Taxes .02 -.04 -.11 -.15* 
(.06) (.07) (.07) (.07) 
Unemployment .30* .30 .04 .08 
(.06) (.06) (.07) (.08) 
Number of Observations 2131 1494 2131 1172 
Log Likelihood -1500.8 -734.71 -1500.8 -588.27 
Standard Errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 95% level; ** indicates significance at 
90% level. 
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as individual-specific: they are the voter's stated position on each issue, 
rather than the distance from the voter to the party. We treat Alliance as the 
base, or reference, category. Thus we report in the first two columns the es­
timates for Conservative relative to Alliance, for multinomial logit and bino­
mial logit, respectively; and we report in columns 3 and 4 estimates for 
Labour relative to Alliance, again for multinomial logit and binomial logit, 
respectively. The multinomial logit estimates come from full information 
maximum likelihood utilizing the entire sample; the binomial logit estimates 
come from two separate binomial logit estimates. The first binomial logit 
omits voters who chose Labour; the second binomial logit omits voters who 
chose Conservative.6 
Cursory inspection of Table 2 shows that the estimated coefficients for 
each respective pairwise comparison are, though not actually identical, sta­
tistically indistinguishable across the multinomial logit and binomial logit 
estimates. Multinomial logit and binomial logit do not produce identical es­
timates of the coefficients in the samples; the multinomial logit estimator is 
working with more data than either of the two separate sets of binomial logit 
estimates. But the point is that they produce consistent estimates of the same 
parameters. Thus while the multinomial and binomial logit estimates in 
Table 2 are not identical to each other, ocular examination of them is con­
vincing evidence that they are awfully close to each other. As an estimation 
technique multinomial logit should be preferred to binomial logit because it 
is more efficient, but this simply means that it will approach the true param­
eters more quickly than will binomial logit.7 However, multinomial logit is 
a model of pairwise comparisons and as such it posits the same choice pro­
cess as binomial logit models do. 
2.4 Equivalence of Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit-A Simulation 
To further illustrate the equivalence of multinomial logit and successive 
applications of binomial logit we offer a simulation. We specified the fol­
lowing spatial model: 
[4] 
6Whitten and Palmer ( 1996) compare multinomial logit estimates to binomial logit estimates 
not of successive pairwise comparisons, but rather to binomial logit estimates of "incumbent" ver­
sus "nonincumbent." This coding scheme of the dependent variables is really simply an induced 
measurement error: the resulting comparisons say nothing about multinomial logit vs. binomial 
logit. Of course Whitten and Palmer are absolutely correct in suggesting that researchers avoid 
recoding a trichotomous variable into a dichotomous variable: but they should not translate that ad­
vice into unduly broad claims regarding multinomial logit. 
7However, the standard errors in Table 2 are almost identical across the multinomial logit and 
binomial logit estimates, suggesting that multinomial logit will have no more statistical power than 
successive binomial logit estimates in samples of these sizes. 
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Ui2 = -2 * (xi - C2J2 - 3 * (yi - C2y)2 + ui2 




where xi and Yi indicate the i1h respondent's ideal point on the X and Yaxes, 
respectively; and Cj x and Cjy indicate the position of the ph party on the X and 
Y axes, respectively. The utility of the i th individual for the j1h party is a func­
tion of the distance between the party and the individual on the X and Y axes; 
and the individual has separable preferences. Obviously since this model de­
pends upon the position of the decisionmaker relative to the position of the 
parties, the characteristics of the parties (alternatives) are relevant. We placed 
three parties in a two dimensional issue space: Party 1 at (-2,0), Party 2 at 
(0,2), and Party 3 at (2,0). The positions of 5,000 voters were drawn from two 
independent normal distributions, both with mean 0 and variance 2, deter­
mining their placement on the x and y axes. Consistent with both multino­
mial logit and binomial logit models, the disturbances are independent and 
identically distributed with type I extreme value distributions. 
We first estimated a model with only the respondent's characteristics on 
the right-hand side. This is our naive model, which we estimated with both 
binomial logit and multinomial logit (later we estimate a correct systemic 
specification using conditional logit). The parameter estimates for multino­
mial logit and binomial logit are reported in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 report 
the probability of choosing choice 2 relative to choice 1 for multinomial 
logit and binomial logit respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report estimates for 
the probability of choosing choice 3 relative to choice 1 ,  again for multino­
mial logit and binomial logit respectively. The estimates are almost identical 
because they are estimates of the same parameters. As our sample size in­
creases, the estimates would become indistinguishable. Again, this illus­




Table 3. Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit Estimates 
of a Simulated Spatial Model 
MNL BL MNL BL 
(Choice 2)/ (Choice 2)/ (Choice 3)/ (Choice 3)/ 
(Choice 1) (Choice 1) (Choice 1)  (Choice 1) 
-.42 -.43 -.04 -.04 
(.11) (.12) (.10) (.11) 
.98 .94 1 .99 2.07 
( .04) (.05) (.06) ( .10) 
1.44 1.40 -.01 -.01 
(.05) ( .06) ( .03) (.03) 
Observations 5000 
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set of successive binomial logit estimates, because the multinomial logit es­
timates are estimates of the exact same phenomena. But notice that both sets 
of parameters specify the wrong model. To estimate the right model, which 
would include the distance from the respondents to the parties on the issues, 
we need conditional logit. 
2.5 Conditional Logit 
The conditional logit model (i.e., conditional on the choices) is a funda­
mentally different model specification than multinomial logit or binomial 
logit. Conditional logit allows for an individual's utility of an alternative to 
be based upon the characteristics of the alternative. Thus the i1h individual's 
utility of the ph alternative will be given by: 
[7] 
where Xii indicates a variable measuring the characteristics of alternative j 
relative to individual i.8 Multinomial logit did not include characteristics of 
the alternative on the right-hand side. The characteristics of the alternative 
are subscripted with respect to the individual because these characteristics 
(such as the ideological distance between the party and the respondent) 
could vary across individuals. The model can be extended to include indi­
vidual-specific characteristics as multinomial logit does (there is no separate 
name for the combined model in the literature, so we continue to refer to this 
model as conditional logit): 
[8] 
where ai is a vector of characteristics of the i th individual. Thus this model 
will yield one coefficient ({J) for each alternative-specific variable, and J co­
efficients (lf/1, lf/2, . • .  , lf/1) for each individual-specific variable where J is 
the number of alternatives.9 However, as with multinomial logit, one of the 
sets of lfl's is normalized (generally to 0, and generally for the first alterna­
tive), hence actually J - 1 sets of lfl's are estimated. 
8Both multinomial logit and conditional logit assume the disturbances have independent ex­
treme-value distributions, and the likelihood functions in both models can be expressed as functions 
of ev, where V represents the systemic component of each model; but the underlying specifications 
are still fundamentally different from a substantive perspective since they include different informa­
tion on the right-hand side. 
9In the models we consider here, the multinomial logit model allows the issue parameters to 
vary across choices, whereas the issue parameters (/J) in the conditional logit models presented here 
do not. However, the conditional logit model can be specified with the issue parameters varying 
across choices. 
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Probabilities are of the form: 
[9] 
Both conditional logit and multinomial logit models assume that the distur­
bances, uiJ, are independent across alternatives. 
2.6 Conditional Logit-An Example 
To demonstrate what conditional logit estimates look like we again turn 
to the data from the 1 987 British general election, and here we contrast con­
ditional logit estimates to the multinomial logit and pairwise binomial logit 
results presented earlier. We present the conditional logit estimates in Table 
4. We do not have a great deal to say about these estimates here, except to 
note two points. First, the specification of the issue distance variables differs 
from that used in Table 2. Here, we specify the issue measures as the dis­
tance between the voter and the party on each issue. 10 Also, we estimate 
only one issue distance parameter for each issue (the first seven coefficients 
reported in Table 4 ), whereas in Table 2 there were two estimated coeffi­
cients for each issue (where each represented the position of the respondent, 
not the distance between the respondent and the party). Thus conditional 
logit permits a much better specification of the spatial model and of the re­
lationship between issues, parties, and voters than does multinomial logit. 
Second, we include the other variables representing economic perceptions, 
class, and demographic status as individual-specific variables. Thus this 
conditional logit model has both choice-specific and individual-specific co­
efficients. The first column of individual-specific coefficients is for Conser­
vative relative to Alliance, the second column of individual-specific coeffi­
cients is for Labour relative to Alliance. 
With both the multinomial logit estimates from Table 2 and the condi­
tional logit estimates we could compute tables of first differences-the ef­
fect of a change in the independent variable on the probability of choosing 
each party-based on the individual's characteristics. These first differences 
could provide the answers to a set of questions regarding the impact of vot­
ers' characteristics on choice. However, an interesting substantive question 
is not only what is the effect of changes in the characteristics of the voter, 
but what is the effect of changes in the characteristics of the parties. Condi­
tional logit lets us examine what happens as parties change their positions in 
the issue space. Multinomial logit does not let us do this. 
10We measure the party's position as the sample average placement of the party by all 
respondents. 
Table 4. Conditional Logit Estimates 
British Election-1987 
Conservative/ Alliance Labour/ Alliance 
Defensea -.18* 
(.02) 
Phillips Curve -.11* 
(.02) 










Intercept .82 2.53* 
(.69) (.75) 
South -.15 -.44* 
(.17) (.21) 
Midlands -.29** .19 
(.17) (.20) 
North -.06 .64* 
(.18) ( .19) 
Wales .48 1.3* 
(.36) (.31) 
Scotland -.41 .69* 
(.25) (.25) 
Union Member -.50* .37* 
(.16) (.16) 
Public Sector Employee .09 - .02 
(.15) (.16) 
Blue Collar .11 .70* 
(.15) ( .16) 
Gender .28* .00 
( .14) (.15) 
Age .02 -.22* 
(.05) (.05) 
Homeowner .37* -.54* 
( .18) ( .16) 
Income .07* -.06 
(.03) (.03) 
Education -.82* - .61 ** 
(.32) (.35) 
Inflation .28* - .03 
( .10) (.11) 
Taxes .01 -.10 
( .07) ( .07) 
Unemployment .28* .01 
( .06) (.07) 
N .  2131 
Log Likelihood -1477.6 
aThe seven issues represent distance-absolute value-from the respondent to the mean of the party 
position. 
Standard Errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 95% level; ** indicates significance at 
90% level. 
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For instance, a major question regarding British elections is to what ex­
tent the extremity of Labour's left wing positions hurt the party. This cannot 
be answered by considering differences caused by moving voters; rather to 
answer this we need to see what would happen if Labour moved on the is­
sues (or, to be more precise, if respondents' perceptions of Labour's position 
changed systematically). To test this we reset Labour's mean perceived issue 
position to be one half standard deviation to the left, and one half standard 
deviation to the right of its actual mean perceived issue position on each of 
the seven issues. We then computed the distance Labour would be from each 
voter at these new positions, and computed the probability of each voter vot­
ing for each of the three parties under these two hypothetical scenarios. 11 
The difference it). predicted aggregate vote-share at the two hypothetical po­
sitions for Labour is the impact of a shift on that issue. We report the esti­
mated aggregate vote-shares for each of the three parties with Labour at both 
hypothetical positions on each issue, as well as the difference, in Table 5. 
Note again that these are estimates aggregated across all respondents. The 
largest impact that a one standard deviation change in Labour's position on 
any single issue would have is on nationalization of industry: where Labour 
moving one standard deviation would yield them a 3.1  % increase in aggre­
gate vote share. The last row of the table indicates that were Labour to move 
one standard deviation on all seven issues simultaneously they would in­
crease their vote-share by 6.8%; with 3.6% of that coming at the Conserva­
tive party's expense and 3.2% coming at the Alliance's expense. Using this 
technique we could also determine the optimal placement of Labour on each 
of the seven issues. 12 
We present no similar table for multinomial logit because it is impos­
sible to do so. The multinomial logit estimates cannot be used to make any 
inferences about the effect of moving the parties because the position of the 
party is not part of the multinomial logit model.13 This, not the precise mag­
nitude of impacts of Labour's movement on the issues, is what we wish to 
11This technique is similar to that employed by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), and later by 
Nagler (1991, 1994) to estimate the impact of an institutional change in voting rules on turnout. In 
both cases the key is to change a variable of interest and then estimate new predicted probabilities 
for each voter, then aggregate over all voters to measure the total impact of the change. 
12See Alvarez, Bowler, and Nagler (1996) for a demonstration of this approach to determining 
the optimal positions of parties on issues . 
13The superiority of the conditional logit model over multinomial logit is not a new notion in 
the literature, either. This point has been made in a number of different places (c.f. Agresti 1990; 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985; Hoffman and Duncan 1988; McFadden 1973). However, the differ­
ences between the conditional logit and multinomial logit model are not widely appreciated in politi­
cal science. Our intention here is not to break new technical ground in the comparison of multino­
mial logit and conditional logit, but rather to make political scientists more cognizant of the 
implications of choosing between the two techniques. 
Table 5. Conditional Logit Estimates of Effect of Movement by the 
1 
Labour Party ±2 Standard Deviation-British Election-1987 
Conservatives Labour Alliance 
Baseline 45.2 29.5 25.3 
Defense -le; 2 45.7 28.3 26.0 
+la 
2 44.7 30.6 24.8 
Difference -1.0 2.3 -1.3 
Phillips 
1 -2a 45.2 29.7 25.2 
+la 
2 45.3 29.0 25.7 
Difference 0.2 --0.7 0.6 
Taxation 
1 -2a 45.6 28.6 25.8 
+la 
2 45.1 29.4 25.5 
Difference --0.5 0.8 --0.3 
Nationalization 
1 -2a 45.9 27.7 26.4 
+le; 
2 44.6 30.8 24.6 
Difference -1.3 3.1 -1.8 
Redistribution 
1 -2a 45.3 29.2 25.5 
+la 
2 45.2 29.4 25.4 
Difference --0.1 0.2 --0.0 
Crime 
1 -2a 45.6 28.4 26.0 
+le; 
2 44.9 29.9 25.1 
Difference --0.7 1.5 0.8 
Welfare 
1 -2a 45.4 29.3 25.4 
+la 
2 45.2 29.3 25.6 
Difference --0.2 0.0 0.2 
All Issues 
1 -2a 47.1 24.9 28 .0 
+le; 
2 43.5 31.8 24.7 
Difference -3.6 6.8 -3.2 
Note: Estimated impact of the Labour party moving from one half a standard deviation to the left of 
its mean perceived position to one half a standard deviation to the right of its mean perceived posi­
tion on each of seven issues. The final row simulates Labour moving simultaneously on all seven 
issues. Column entries are estimated aggregate vote-shares. 
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emphasize with Table 5. The impact of a change by the party on the issues is 
a major question regarding elections. Yet multinomial logit can supply abso­
lutely no information about this.14 This is what we feel is the major reason 
for using conditional logit rather than multinomial logit. We are political sci­
entists. We should analyze politics. 
3. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (llA) 
While conditional logit is good, it is not perfect. A major characteristic 
of both multinomial logit and conditional logit is that they impose the "irrel­
evance of independent alternatives" (IIA) property. As we described earlier, 
IIA holds when the ratio of the probability of choosing alternative j to the 
probability of choosing alternative k is not changed if more choices are 
added to or subtracted from the choice set, or: 
[ 10] 
where Ss and SP denote sets of alternatives, j, k E SP, and j, k E Ss , and 
P iii Ss denotes the probability of the i th individual choosing alternative j from 
choice set Ss.15 To maintain the IIA condition is troubling when viewed from 
the perspective of several prominent political science theories of voter deci­
sion-making in elections. First, consider a spatial model of voting where in­
dividuals vote for the party closest to their ideal point in an issue space. If 
we imagine a new party entering an election, our intuition is that the new 
party would take most of its votes from the parties closest to it in the issue 
space. This is not consistent with IIA at the individual level (though IIA may 
hold at the individual level and not preclude such a result at the aggregate 
level). 
In simple terms, IIA implies that in a contest between a liberal and a 
conservative party, the entry of a second conservative party will not alter the 
relative probability that an individual voter chooses between the initial two 
parties. However, because the two conservative parties are close together in 
the issue space, and hence are likely to be viewed as substitutes by voters, 
our intuition suggests that the relative probabilities will change. 
Consider an extreme case of an election in a single dimensional space 
that initially has two parties (i.e., I Ssl = 2). Say the two parties are a liberal 
14We discuss more fully the technical relationship between multinomial logit and conditional 
logit estimates in Appendix B .  
15It is very important to  note here that the IIA property i s  an  assumption we  make about the 
behavior of individuals. It is not an aggregate property, since it is possible for IIA to hold for indi­
viduals but to be violated in the aggregate. We discuss this point fully in Appendix C. 
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and a conservative (Parties numbers 1 and 2, respectively). And say voter i 
is a moderate who is indifferent between the two choices. Then: Pn = P;2 = 
0.5, and P;/P;2 = 1 .  Now add another conservative party to the set, one that 
is indistinguishable from Party 2. The voter might still have probability of .5 
of voting liberal and .5 of voting conservative. After all, he or she really still 
only has two unique choices: vote liberal or vote conservative. Choosing 
between the two identical conservative parties would presumably be done 
by the flip of a coin. This would yield: Pn = .5, Pi2 = P;3 = .25; which would 
mean that P;1 I P;2 = 2. This is a violation of the IIA condition. It is impor­
tant to bear in mind that the set of probabilities presented here based on the 
entry of the third party here are derived from a choice process we assume for 
the voter. 
Now consider a more complex case. Figure 1 portrays the three parties 
from our earlier simulations and a voter at (0,0). Here we have a two dimen­
sional issue space, with one dimension for economic issues and the other for 
social issues. Notice that Parties 1 ,  2, and 3 are viewed as "equivalent" by 
the voter: they are each two units away from the voter. In fact in the two di­
mensional space it is easy to see that there are potentially an unlimited num­
ber of parties that would be viewed by the voter as equivalent: all parties on 
a circle of radius 2 centered at the origin would appear as identical to this 
voter according to the spatial model. However, politically the three parties 
depicted clearly represent very distinct choices: Party 1 is moderate on the 
social issue, but to the right on the economic issue; Party 2 is also socially 
moderate, but to the left on the economic issue; and Party 3 is to the right on 
the social issue, but moderate on the economic issue. Now we add Party 4 at 
( 1 .95,0), which is viewed by the spatial model as being ".05 different" than 
Party 1 on the economic issue, and also only ".05 different" than Party 2 vis­
a-vis the voter on the economic issue and even only ".05 different" than 
Party 3 vis-a-vis the voter taking into account both issue dimensions. Yet 
most students of politics would say that nine out of 1 0  voters would tell us 
that Parties 1 and 4 are very similar and that Party 4 is very different from 
Party 2 or Party 3. 
Because the spatial model abstracts away the closeness of the parties to 
each other by only measuring the distance from parties to the voter the spa­
tial model has no notion of parties as substitutes. The spatial model no more 
views identical parties to be substitutes for one another than it does parties 
which are located at diametrically opposed positions on the issue scale-as 
long as the parties are equidistant from the voter they are treated the same. 
The spatial model cannot pick up closeness of parties to each other. 
In addition to posing a challenge for spatial models, IIA poses a chal­
lenge for retrospective voting models. Retrospective voting models posit in­
dividuals' choices to be functions of their evaluations of the incumbent 
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Figure 1.  
Social Issue 
(0,2) = Party 3 
Economic Issue 
(-2,0) = Party 2 (0,0) = Voter (2,0) = Party 1 
\ 
(1.95,0) =Party 4 
party. Such models are rarely explicit on how multiple alternatives to the in­
cumbent party should be treated; but it seems safe to suppose that the 
nonincurtJ.bent alternatives would be grouped by voters and treated as having 
some inherent similarity. In fact the choice process would presumably look 
exactly like the choice process posited by a nested logit model: where a 
voter first chooses between two sets-incumbent party and all other par­
ties-and if the chosen set has more than one choice within it then the voter 
would then choose from among those choices. 
Again, consider the extreme choice. Say the probability of choosing the 
incumbent party is Pa and the probability of choosing the j1h challenger's 
party is P;Ci. If a voter first chooses between {incumbent party} vs. 
{nonincumbents party}, chooses the first set with probability Pisl and the 
second set with probability P;.2, and if all nonincumbents parties are treated 
equally, then Pa will be independent of the number of challengers and P;c 
is determined by the number of challengers. Obviously the ratio Pal P;c is 
not independent of the number of alternatives, and IIA is again violated. 1 
The above examples are political science analogues of the classic red 
bus/blue bus problem in econometrics. Imagine an individual who can 
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choose between two modes of transportation: a red bus or a car. If the indi­
vidual is indifferent between these modes then the respective probabilities 
will be .5. Now if a blue bus is added to the choice set there is no reason to 
think this alters a person's probability of choosing to travel by car (since the 
buses differ only in color and on no other relevant dimension), it seems ap­
parent that the probability of choosing a car for most individuals will remain 
.5. Yet the probability of choosing the blue bus will now be .25, and the 
probability of choosing the red bus will be .25 (assuming people are indiffer­
ent as to the color of the bus they ride in). Thus the ratio of Pca/Pbluebus will 
change and IIA is violated. 
In the spatial model analog to the red bus/blue bus problem, we have 
two parties with (almost) identical positions on the ideological dimension. If 
a voter chooses on the basis of ideology, and not parties, it is irrelevant how 
many parties occupy a particular ideological position. Yet models which im­
pose IIA insist that the voters choose among parties, not among issue posi­
tions, since parties cannot be substitutes in these models. This is a very 
strong belief about the importance of party as a label for candidates. 
We want to emphasize that IIA is fundamentally an assumption about 
how individuals make decisions: it is not an assumption about what is on the 
right-hand side of a model nor the distribution of the disturbances. Notice 
that in our discussion of IIA in this section we have only talked about IIA in 
terms of relative probabilities of individual choice, and that we have intro­
duced no particular model specification. This should reinforce the idea that 
IIA is about how individuals choose, and that it is not an assumption we 
make about how choice models are specified. 
In general, models that give the probability of choosing parties as: 
where: 
• xi} = characteristics of the i th voter relative to the j th party 
• A; = characteristics of the i th voter 
• zj = characteristics of the j th party 
[ 1 1 ] 
will always impose IIA. This is because if we look at this equation, we see 
that the only things involved in determining PiJ/Pik are the characteristics of 
the voter and the j1h and k'h parties; neither the existence nor characteristics 
of any other parties come into play. Thus IIA is guaranteed to hold: there is 
no way that the inclusion of additional choices could alter PiJ/Pik· This is the 
crux of the problem. To avoid assuming or imposing IIA we must have a 
WHEN POLITICS AND MODELS COLLIDE 75 
model where P;/Pik incorporates properties of choices other than k and j; 
and we would prefer that these be incorporated in the systemic component 
of the model. 
Random utility models generally do not allow for any relationship be­
tween the choices in the systemic component of the model, as each systemic 
component of utility is based on the relationship between a single alternative 
and the decisionmaker. So again, two parties equidistant from the voter are 
treated identically: whether they are diametrically opposed to each other or at 
identical issue positions. This is where a bad fit between the spatial model, 
random utility models, and our intuitions about politics occurs. Currently 
only random utility models with disturbances correlated across choices allow 
for the sort of direct comparison of choices which matches our intuition 
about voter behavior. We believe it is a weakness of random utility models 
that they do not account for substitutability (or similarity) of alternatives in 
the systemic component. 
This leads to another source of confusion in the practical matter of 
econometric model specification. A necessary assumption for an economet­
ric model to be consistent with the HA axiom is that the disturbance terms 
for the individual's utility for each choice be uncorrelated. Thus, one of the 
consequences of the failure of the HA assumption to hold for individual vot­
ers is that these disturbances terms will be correlated. If we use an econo­
metric model which assumes that HA holds, we will end up with inconsis­
tent estimates. 
However, while voters failing to abide by the HA restrictions imply that 
the disturbance terms in a random utility model will be correlated, the corol­
lary is not true-observing correlated disturbances when estimating a ran­
dom utility model does not necessarily imply that the voters are violating the 
HA restriction. Such correlations can be observed because of omitted vari­
ables. Consider a simple error in model specification. Assume that there are 
two candidates who share a common position on a single issue, for example 
they are both pro-choice. Assume the third candidate is pro-life. Now if nei­
ther the candidates' nor the voters' positions on abortion are included in the 
model, then the systemic component of the model will underestimate the ten­
dency of pro-choice voters to prefer both of the first two candidates. This 
could result in estimating positively correlated disturbances for the two pro­
choice candidates. However, the voters may be obeying the HA restrictions. 
In this case, correcting the model specification by including abortion will 
lead to uncorrelated disturbances. Should the voters fail to obey the HA con­
dition, correlated errors will still be observed even with abortion included in 
the model. This brings us back to the point we made above: HA is an assump­
tion about voter behavior, but it is not an econometric assumption about the 
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distribution of disturbance terms. Our substantive assumptions about behav­
ior come first; then we adopt a set of econometric assumptions consistent 
with our behavioral assumptions. l6 
What the above example demonstrates is that if voters do not obey the 
IIA constraint, then kitchen sink solutions of adding right-hand side vari­
ables to the utility functions will not solve the problem and lead to consistent 
estimates. What would be much more satisfactory would be a theory which 
detailed the process which caused correlations among the disturbances and 
allowed us to parameterize and estimate those correlations.17 Development 
of such models would allow for tests of competing theories of voter deci­
sion-making.18 
4. Models Which Do Not Assume IIA 
4.1 Multinomial Probit and British Politics 
There are two models of discrete choice which do not assume IIA: the 
generalized extreme-value model (GEV) and the multinomial probit model 
(MNP).19 The GEV model imposes the constraint that the researcher must a 
priori specify a grouping of choices. The multinomial probit model is more 
flexible: it imposes no a priori constraint on how respondents view the 
choices. Multinomial probit allows for both individual specific and alterna­
tive-specific variables.20 The IIA assumption is removed because the error 
1 6This is the fundamental point of King (1989): we should develop substantive models, then 
write down likelihood functions that accurately represent our assumptions of the real world. 
1 7The Hausman-Wise formulation of MNP does allow for the stochastic component to be a 
function of characteristics of the alternatives-a backdoor way of letting substance in. 
1 8 An interesting development in this direction can be seen in the work on "quanta! response 
equilibria" by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995a, 1995b). In this class of game theoretic models, play­
ers are assumed to make choices much in the same way econometricians assume people make deci­
sions using discrete choice models. In the quanta! response model, players have utilities defined 
over outcomes which are a function of conditional expected utilities for each action which are 
known to all players and a random component which is known only by each player. By assuming 
that the random component has a certain distribution (usually that it is type I extreme value), 
McKelvey and Palfrey are able to derive choice probabilities which follow the standard multinomial 
logit distribution, and which under certain additional assumptions produce predictions about the 
relative likelihoods about which strategies players will use. It is possible that future work on quanta! 
response can relax the IIA assumption (which has been in the work to date) and could use utility 
functions which incorporate the aspects of political choice which are absent from the common speci­
fications of the spatial model. 
1 9GEV is equivalent to nested logit when the coefficient of inclusive value is not constrained 
to be 1. 
20The multinomial probit model we specify here follows the framework originally proposed by 
Hausman and Wise (1978), which has been widely discussed in the econometric literature (B olduc 
1992; Bunch 1991; Daganzo 1979; Dansie 1985; Keane 1992) and which has been seeing notice in 
the political science literature (Alvarez and Nagler 1995, 1997). Many of the recent papers on the 
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process of the multinomial probit model allows for correlations between the 
disturbances for the different choices.21 
In Table 6 we present multinomial probit estimates of a model of the 
1987 British election where the systemic component of the model is speci­
fied exactly as was our conditional logit model. The structure of the coeffi­
cients is the same as for conditional logit: we have one set of coefficients for 
the issue distance variables and two sets of coefficients for the individual­
level variables. What is different here is that we estimate the error correla­
tions across the disturbances. And the two estimated error correlations are 
statistically significant: the correlation between the disturbances for Labour 
and Alliance is .34, and the correlation between the disturbances for Conser­
vative and Labour is -.39.22 Thus we are at least 99% confident that IIA is 
violated. 
We see that IIA was violated. What does this imply? As we stated ear­
lier, this suggests that inferences made of a hypothetical two party race will 
be particularly suspect. To see the extent of the possible error, we computed 
predicted vote-shares for Labour and Conservative in a two-party race with 
Alliance omitted using both the conditional logit estimates reported in Table 
4, and the multinomial probit estimates reported in Table 6. Table 7 gives the 
estimated vote shares in two- and three-party races using both models. The 
multinomial probit model have focused on identification and estimability of this model (B orsch­
Supan 1989; B orsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 1993; Geweke 1987; Keane 1994; Lerman and 
Manski 1981; McFadden 1989; Pakes and Pollard 1989). Following this literature, we estimate only 
two of the six possible parameters in the error covariance matrix; the standard result in the literature 
is that at most there are only [K(K - 1)/2] - l free parameters in the error covariance matrix after al­
lowing for scaling (where K is the number of choices) (Bolduc 1992; Bunch 1991). In Alvarez and 
Nagler (1995) we estimated three correlations between disturbances in an MNP model. Such a 
specification is not identified (though the earlier work estimated two of the three correlations to be 
almost zero [-.07 and -.08] the results remain the same when only two correlations are estimated), 
and we thank Eric Lawrence for his many discussions with us about the identification of that par­
ticular specification. We avoid the "fragile identification" problem inherent in multinomial probit 
models by restricting the f3 parameters to be equal across parties. Additi onally, the generalized 
extreme-value model has received widespread attention in the econometric literature since 
McFadden's seminal contributions (1974, 1978, 1981) [see Brownstone and Small (1989) for a re­
view of the early literature]. For an extensive comparison of the multinomial probit and general ex­
treme-value models with political science applications see Alvarez and Nagler (1997). 
2 1See Alvarez and Nagler (1995), Appendix I, for a description of the model. 
22There are three possible disturbance covariance matrices which can be considered if two cor­
relations between disturbances are estimated. We estimated all three. One such matrix (with the cor­
relation between the disturbance of Labour and Alliance constrained to be zero) is rejected since the 
estimated matrix was not positive definite. The other two produce results that are statistically indis­
tinguishable and substantively similar. Since assuming that the disturbances between Labour and 
Conservative are uncorrelated seems to be the less plausible assumption, we report results from the 
model with the correlation between Conservative and Alliance constrained to be zero. 
Table 6. Multinomial Probit Estimates, 1987 British Election 













Welfare -.11 * 
(.02) 
Constant .35 1.84* 
(.73) (.63) 
South -.09 -.30* 
(.13) (.14) 
Midlands -.23** -.11 
(.14) (.14) 
North -.12 .43* 
( .15) (.13) 
Wales -.49** .95* 
(.27) (.22) 
Scotland -.42* .48* 
(.20) (.17) 
Union Member -.45* .26* 
(.14) (.11) 
Public Sector Employee .08 .01 
(.12) (.11) 
Blue Collar .02 .47* 
(.12) (.12) 
Female .21 ** -.04 
(.11) (.10) 
Age .03 -.16* 
(.04) (.04) 
Home Ownership .37* -.37* 
(.14) (.12) 
Family Income .06* -.05* 
(.02) (.02) 
Education -.63** -.46 
(.36) (.31) 
Inflation .23* -.01 
(.08) (.08) 
Unemployment .23* -.00 
(.05) (.05) 






Number of Obs 2131 
LL -1476.5 
Standard Errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 95% level; ** indicates significance at 
90% level. 
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Table 7. Estimated Aggregate Vote Shares: 
Three-Party and Two-Party Races 
Conditional Multinomial 
Lo git Pro bit 
Three-Party Race 
Conservative 45.2 44.9 
Labour 29.5 29.8 
Alliance 25.3 25.2 
Two-Party Race 
Conservative 59.1 57.5 
Labour 40.9 42.5 
Column entries are predicted aggregate vote shares by Conditional Logit and Mul­
tinomial Probit, for three-party races and two-party races. 
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conditional lo git and multinomial pro bit estimates of three party vote shares 
are very close: the Conservative and Labour shares differ by only .3 % across 
the two models. However, the two-party shares differs by 1 .7% across the 
two models. A difference of 1 .7% of the vote may not seem very large, but 
in close elections this could be the difference between winning and losing. 
This result demonstrates the critical nature of the presence of a center 
party in British politics for the electoral fortunes of Labour. With the Alli­
ance a viable force in British politics in 1 987, Labour is clearly disadvan­
taged (Alvarez, Bowler, and Nagler 1996). Additionally, this shows the way 
in whi9h the multinomial probit model can help answer important political 
questions when the IIA condition is not met in electoral situations. 
4.2 Simulated Multinomial Probit and Multiparty Politics 
The multinomial probit model is the preferred discrete choice model for 
examining voter choice in multiparty and multicandidate elections. But, with 
the exception of relatively simple applications where there is a limited choice 
set (like the 1987 British election in the previous section, or the 1 992 Ameri­
can presidential election, both situations with three choices facing voters), 
the multinomial probit model has not seen much use in the political science 
literature.23 This is due to the fact that estimation of even three choice multi­
nomial probit models had, until recently, required the numerical integration 
of bivariate normal distributions, which is computationally difficult even 
23Exceptions include the work of Alvarez and Nagler (1995) and Alvarez (1997) on U.S . presi­
dential elections, Alvarez, B owler, and Nagler (1996) on British politics, Dow (1997) on French 
presidential elections, Lawrence (1997) on U.S .  presidential primary elections, Quinn, Martin, and 
Whitford (1996) on Dutch elections, and Schofield et al. (1997) on Dutch and German elections. 
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using the relative fast computers available to many political scientists. The 
computational problem had been so severe that most authors state that esti­
mation of the multinomial probit model with more than four choices is im­
possible using direct numerical integration of multivariate normal densities 
in maximum-likelihood models. This has led some to assert that the multino­
mial probit model is of limited use in political science (e.g., Whitten and 
Palmer 1996). 
But recent advances in estimation techniques (as opposed to simply the 
expected advances in brute force computing power) have brought significant 
reductions in the computational cost of estimating multinomial probit 
models. One advance has been in the use of the method of simulated mo­
ments (McFadden 1 9 89; Pakes and Pollard 1 989); others have advocated 
Gibbs sampling approaches using the innovative concept of data augmenta­
tion (Albert and Chib 1 993; McCulloch and Rossi 1 994). The third advance 
has come in the use of simulated maximum-likelihood to estimate multi­
nomial probit models, especially with the development of the Geweke­
Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) probability simulator for multivariate normal 
densities (Geweke 1 99 1 ;  Geweke, Keane, and Runkle 1 994; Hajivassiliou 
and McFadden 1990; Keane 1994). 
Here we discuss only the use of the GHK probability simulator for the 
estimation of multinomial pro bit models, since this approach is an extension 
of the maximum-likelihood estimation of multinomial probit models using 
direct numerical integration of multivariate normal densities. In fact, we still 
will use the maximum-likelihood approach for estimation of the multino­
mial probit model; however, instead of numerically evaluating multivariate 
normal densities we will recursively simulate these densities. In Appendix D 
we present a more technical description of the GHK probability simulation 
approach. 
We begin with a simple, but compelling, replication of the multinomial 
probit model we presented in the previous section. In Table 8 we present 
multinomial probit estimates generated using the GHK simulation method 
of the same model of the 1 987 British general election we estimated in the 
previous section using traditional maximum likelihood and numerical evalu­
ation of bivariate integrals. Comparing the results in Tables 6 and 8 shows 
that the simulated multinomial probit estimates are generally almost identi­
cal to those presented in Table 6. In the few cases where estimated values are 
not identical between the two sets of estimates, they are statistically indistin­
guishable. The estimated standard errors are also almost identical across the 
two sets of estimates. 
Next, we tum to an application which demonstrates the ability of the 
simulated maximum-likelihood to estimate multinomial probit models in a 
situation where voters can choose from five political parties-the 1 994 par­
liamentary elections in the Netherlands. Elections in the Netherlands were 
Table 8. Simulated Multinomial Probit Estimates, 
1987 British Election 















Constant .40 1.85* 
(.61) ( .49) 
South -.09 -.29* 
(.13) (.14) 
Midlands -.22** -.10 
(.13) (.14) 
North -.10 .44* 
(.14) (.14) 
Wales -.47** .95* 
( .27) (.22) 
Scotland -.39* .49* 
(.20) ( .17) 
Union Member -.44* .25* 
(.13) ( .11) 
Public Sector Employee .09 .01 
( .12) (.11) 
Blue Collar .03 .48* 
(.12) ( .12) 
Female .20** -.04 
(.11) ( .10) 
Age .03 -.16* 
(.04) (.03) 
Home Ownership .35* -.37* 
(.14) ( .12) 
Family Income .06* -.04* 
(.02) ( .02) 
Education -.63* -.47 
(.28) ( .23) 
Inflation .23* -.00 
(.08) ( .08) 
Unemployment .23* .00 
(.05) (.05) 






Number of Obs 2131 
LL -1486.2 
Standard Errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 95% level ; ** indicates significance at 
90% level. 
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long thought to be quite predictable, given that voting seemed to revolve pri­
marily around social and religious cleavages in the electorate (Daalder 1966; 
Lijphart 1968). However, many scholars have begun to reexamine electoral 
politics in the Netherlands given the sudden rise in electoral volatility in re­
cent decades (e.g., Middendorp and Tanke 1 990; Van Der Eijk and Nie­
moller 1987; Whitten and Palmer 1996). Unfortunately few of the existing 
studies on electoral politics in the Netherlands have utilized models which 
do not assume that IIA holds for voters. 24 
Furthermore, there are a number of important questions which need to 
be answered about political change in the Netherlands. Most immediate is 
determining what has produced the dramatic increase in electoral volatility 
seen in the Netherlands since the mid- 1 960s (Bartolini and Mair 1 990). 
Many scholars attribute this to the breakdown of "consociationalism" (Van 
Der Eijk and Niemoeller 1 983). But what is fueling this breakdown? What 
factors are driving voter choice in contemporary Dutch politics? While some 
have argued that ideology is now determining voter choice (Van Der Eijk 
and Niemoller 1 987), others have asserted that retrospective economic vot­
ing is the key to understanding recent elections in the Netherlands 
(Middendorp and Tanke 1 990), and others have found the explanation some­
where in between (Whitten and Palmer 1 996). 
We use the 1 994 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study for our analysis. 
We are able to develop a set of independent variables which would allow for 
close examination of the factors which determined voting in this election 
(ideological positioning of the parties, views on materialist and post-materi­
alist issues, retrospective economic views, as well as religious and social 
status). The survey data were rich enough to allow us to explore voting for 
five of the parties which received the greatest vote shares in the 1 994 elec­
tion: Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA, 22.2%), Labor Party (PvdA, 
24.0%), Liberal Party (VVD, 1 9.9%), Democrats' 66 (D66, 1 5.5 %), and 
Green Left (GL, 3.5%).25 
24Quinn, Martin, and Whitford (1996) and Schofield et al. (1997) provide extensive analyses 
of the 1979 Dutch election using a different estimation technique than we utilize ; their work em­
pl oys the Gibbs sampling for estimating multinomial probit models (Albert and Chib 1993 ; 
McCulloch and Rossi 1994). 
25The variables we used in our model of the 1994 Dutch election were taken from the Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Study (DPES) 1994, overseen by H. Ankers and E. V. Oppenhuis; this data 
is available from the ICPSR. The ideology variable we employ is coded as the absolute distance be­
tween the respondent and the mean ideological position of each party, with the latter estimated from 
the survey sample. We use variables measuring materialist and post-materialist values; each of these 
variables are factor scales, where positive values indicate strong materialist or post-materialist val­
ues, constructed from a two dimensional principal components analysis of responses to 17 questions 
included in the DPES (variables v497-v513). To measure economic perceptions, we use three vari­
ables, each of which is coded so that the high category expresses favorable responses about the 
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This means that we estimate a five choice multinomial probit model. 
Since only a limited number of parameters can be estimated in the error co­
variance matrix, we estimated a number of different specifications involving 
four parameters of the error covariance matrix (the estimated coefficients in 
the systemic part of our model were not influenced by which specification of 
the error covariance matrix we estimated). In Table 9 we report the results 
from one of these specifications (the coefficients for the Green Left party are 
normalized to zero).26 
First, we have evidence that HA is violated in these data, since here we 
have one estimated error correlation which is statistically significant 
(OpvnA cnA) while another verges on being statistically significant (OcnA wn) .  
This ir'riplies that inferences made from models which assume HA whl be 
suspect, and instead we should rely on inferences from less restrictive mod­
els of political behavior like that presented here. 
But additionally, in Table 9 we see a number of important estimated ef­
fects. For example, we find that both the ideological positioning of the par­
ties and retrospective economic evaluations were important in determining 
which party voters supported in this election. Both of these results clearly 
support previous work on recent Dutch elections which has found that ideol­
ogy and economic evaluations are strong determinants of voter choice in the 
Netherlands (Middendorp and Tanke 1 990; Van Der Eijk and Niemoller 
1987; Whitten and Palmer 1 996). Yet we also find that attitudes about mate­
rialist and post-materialist values were important determinants of voting, 
thus confirming the continued importance of these cleavages in the politics 
of advanced democratic nations (Inglehart 1 977, 1 990). Last, we estimate 
significant social effects, mainly for the roles of age, gender, and income­
but we do not estimate much of a significant impact for religious affiliations. 
These results may shed light on the breakdown of old social cleavages in 
Dutch politics (e.g., Van Der Eijk and Niemoeller 1 983). Clearly these ques­
tions need further examination, both in the context of Dutch politics and in 
economy, employment, or the respondent's personal finances. We include three indicator variables 
for religious affiliations; atheists are the reference category. We control for the effects of age, educa­
tion, gender, income, and whether the respondent lives in a urban area of the Netherlands. We also 
use indicator variables for whether the voter is a manual worker or a union member. 
26This model took 15 hours to converge on a multiuser Hewlett-Packard Model 735/125 work­
station with 228 megs of memory, using gaussx 3.5 and gauss 3.2.30. While truly reliable speed 
comparisons across different computers are impossible without running identical programs, existing 
benchmarks suggest that newer computers would be significantly faster. According to Hewlett­
Packard's data, newer H-P workstation models are over two times as fast at floating point calcula­
tions as the 735/125. Existing benchmark comparisons indicate that newer Pentium-based comput­
ers now available may also  enable researchers to run similar models faster (benchmarks can be 
found at http://www.unifrankfurt.de/-stst/gaussst.html. 
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Table 9. Simulated Multinomial Probit Estimates, 1994 Dutch Election 
Independent Variables PVDA/GL CDA/GL VVD/GL D66/GL 
Ideology -.37* 
(.06) 
Constant .67 -1.1 1.0 2.6** 
(1.2) (.76) (1.3) (1.3) 
Materialism -2.4* -2.2* -2.5* -1.5 
(.96) (1.1) (1.0) (.98) 
Postmaterialism .58* 1.1 * 1.1 * .54* 
(.19) (.20) (.19) (.18) 
Economy .51 * .72* .28 .16 
( .22) (.23) (.25) (.23) 
Employment .46* .34* .21 .27** 
(.16) (.16) (.16) (.15) 
Personal Finances -.10 -.13 -.40** -.52** 
(.20) (.22) ( .21) (.20) 
Catholic -.31 .86* -.07 -.24 
( .29) (.32) (.86) ( .28) 
Reform .23 -1.1 .30 .02 
(.23) (.76) (.24) (.28) 
Calvinist -.81 1.6** -.07 -.05 
(.88) (.82) (.86) (.81) 
Age 1.50* 1.8* 1.0* -.30 
(.41) (.42) (.40) (.44) 
Education -.15 -.05 -.03 -.18 
(.17) (.17) ( .17) (.17) 
Gender -.40* -.55* -.41 * -.29 
(.18) (.20) (.18) (.19) 
Income .40 .86* 1.1 * .66* 
(.26) ( .28) (.28) (.26) 
Urban .10 .16 .03 .08 
(.10) (.10) (.11) (.10) 
Manual workers -.21 -.73* -.38 -.29 
(.29) (.33) (.29) (.31) 
Union members .25 -.01 -.19 -.00 
(.27) (.30) (.29) (.28) 
<>cvA. vvD .47 
(.31) 
OpvDA, CDA .54* 
(.18) 




Number of Obs 901 
LL -931.0 
Standard Errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 95% level; ** indicates significance at 
90% level. 
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contrast to political change in other advanced democratic nations. Our pur­
pose here is to demonstrate that the technology exists to examine these ques­
tions with flexible and appropriate models. 
5. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated three points in this paper. First, multinomial logit is 
no magic estimator compared to binomial logit. It offers efficiency gains, 
but it is computing estimates of precisely the same parameters as is binomial 
logit. Thus any claims that multinomial logit embodies an individual choice 
process any more complex than two-party comparisons are false. 
Second, if one is interested in more strategic questions about politics, 
such as what would happen if parties or candidates moved in the issue 
space, and what would be the effect of additional parties entering the race 
(i.e., questions that seem to come to mind every presidential primary sea­
son in the United States), then multinomial logit is the wrong model to use 
and researchers should utilize conditional logit. Multinomial logit simply 
ignores what is interesting in elections. Conditional logit utilizes the vital 
information of where parties are located in the issue space, and therefore is 
a better technique for multiparty and multicandidate elections than multi­
nomial logit. 
Third, binomial logit, multinomial logit, and conditional logit are all 
quite limited in that they impose the IIA restriction upon voters. Since con­
ditional logit is representing the classic spatial model quite faithfully, this 
identifies a limitation in the spatial model. The failure of the spatial model to 
consider the closeness of the parties to each other, as well as to the voter, 
may present problems in multicandidate elections. There are econometric 
models that allow for "grouping" of similar choices and thus remove the IIA 
restriction: in particular multinomial probit allows for this and we have 
shown that multinomial probit allows for more accurate predictions in real 
elections of the impact of removal of a third party. 27 
But these econometric models only relax the IIA assumption through 
the specification of the stochastic (random) component of the model. We 
think that if we have some theoretical reason to believe voters do not obey 
the IIA axiom, then it is important to correctly specify how voters perceive 
their choices in the systemic component of our models. For example, if a 
voter faced with three candidates-two conservative candidates and one 
liberal candidate-views the two conservative candidates as identical and 
makes a choice between two ideologies, not three candidates, then that is 
27See Alvarez and Nagler ( 1 997) for a comparison of conditional logit, GEV, and multinomial 
probit estimates. 
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what we need to model. We believe that this will be an important task in 
the future for better understanding voting situations where voters have 
many choices. 
Manuscript submitted 19 March 1996. 
Final manuscript received 10 March 1997. 
APPENDIX A 
Computing Unconditional Probabilities 
from Binomial Logit Probabilities 
Estimating a model via a series of three binomial logits gives one the ability to 
estimate three sets of probabilities : 
• P12 = Prob(Yi = 1 1  { 1 ,2 } )  
• P21 = Prob(Yi = 2  I { 1 ,2 } )  
• P13 = Prob(Yi = 1 1  { 1 ,3 }) 
• P3 1 = Prob(Yi = 3  I { 1 ,3 }) 
• P23 = Prob(Yi = 2 I { 2,3 }) 
• P32 = Prob(Yi = 3  I { 2,3 } )  
What we would like to  recover are the unconditional probabilities : 
• P1 = Prob(Yi = 1 1  { 1 ,2,3 })  
• P2 = Prob(Yi = 2 1  { 1 ,2, 3 } )  
• P3 = Prob(Yi = 3 I { 1 ,2,3 })  
We know 
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Now we substitute, 
[ 1 7) 
[ 1 8) 
[ 1 9) 
[20) 
[2 1 )  
Since P12, P2 1 , and P3 1 are all observed from the binomial logit estimates, w e  can 
compute the unconditional probability P 1 • And similar calculations give the uncondi­
tional probabilities P2 and P3 • 
APPENDIX B 
Multinomial Logit Gives Reduced Form Parameters 
of the Conditional Logit Model 
The difference between conditional logit and multinomial logit is that conditional 
logit includes another piece of information: the position of the party. It would appear 
that since the conditional logit model makes use of more information than the multino­
mial logit model, it should perform better. It should more accurately mirror the truth 
(the spatial model), and hence give better predictions of individual behavior. In fact, we 
demonstrate here that when the true model is the common spatial model based on a 
quadratic utility function, multinomial logit recovers reduced form estimates of the 
spatial model. Hence the probabilities estimated with multinomial logit will be identical 
to the conditional logit probabilities .  And any estimates of effects of changes in X; from 
multinomial logit will be identical to such estimates from conditional logit. But, again, 
one cannot know a principle point of interest here: the effect of changes in party charac­
teristics on voting. 
First, we offer an analytical result for two parties showing that MNL recovers re­
duced form estimates of a common specification of the spatial model . 28 We first define 
several things :  
• X; = i1h Voter 's  Position in  the Issue Space 
• Ci = fh Party's  Position in the Issue Space 
• Dii = Distance from i1h Voter to fh Party 
28By common specification of the spatial model we mean the specification in which voters are 
assumed to evaluate their utility for each party through quadratic (squared) issue distances. The 
simple proof we provide here is dependent upon this particular functional form for voter utilities. 
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Now according to the classic spatial model ; the i1h individual' s  utility of the /h 
choice is :  
or, 
This fits nicely into the conditional logit random utility model (RUM) setup: 
Now notice that: 
where 
D;1 = X'f - 2X;C1 + C( 
D;2 = X[ - 2X;C2 + C:j 
D;1 - D;2 = -2X; (C1 - C2 ) + (C( - Ci ) 
= -2xa* + b* 
a* = (C1 - C2 ) 




Notice that the difference between the two distances is a linear function of the voter's 
position . This suggests that if: 
and lXcJ and /30 are identified then we can substitute -2X,a* = b* for D;1 - D,1 and re­
cover reduced form estimates : 
So one could recover: 
Pr(Yj = 1) = f(a0 + /31 (-2X;a* )  + /31b* )  
= f(a0 + /31b* ) + (-2a*/31X1 ) 
ii = a0 + f31b* 
/i = -2a* /31 
from standard MNL estimates (i .e . ,  binomial logit in this case). Again, note that this 




To explicate these points, we used conditional logit to estimate the simulation model 
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Table Bl. Conditional Logit Estimates 
of a Spatial Model 
(Party 2)/ (Party 3)/ 




(.01) (.0 1 )  
-.36 -.36 
(.01) ( .01) 
Observations 5000 
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include the position of the party, the conditional logit estimates faithfully correspond to 
the true model . The conditional logit estimates are reported in Table B 1 .  What is of 
interest here are predicted probabilities from conditional logit and multinomial logit. We 
report predicted probabilities for a voter who we move from -2 to 2 along the x-axis in 
Table B2. Notice that the multinomial logit model predicts probability estimates identi­
cal to the conditional logit model, despite using less information. This suggests that if 
we were to compute the first difference to estimate the impact of a change in respon­
dents ' characteristics on the probability of voting for any party these would be identical 
across the conditional logit and multinomial logit estimates. For instance, both condi­
tional logit and multinomial logit predict that a respondent moving from (-2,0) to 
(-1 .5 ,0) would cause a .07 change in the probability of voting for Party 1 .  However, 
Table B2. Multinomial Logit Estimates and Conditional Logit 
Estimates of Probabilities for an Individual in the Issue Space 
Probability Probability Probability 
Party 1 :  Party 2:  Party 3: 
Pi (MNL) � (CL) A_ (MNL) A_ CCL) ACMNL) AccL) 
x y 
-2 0 .90 .90 .08 .08 .02 .02 
-1.5 0 .83 .83 .12 .12 .04 .04 
-1 0 .73 .73 .18 .18 .10 .10 
-.5 0 .57 .56 .23 .23 .20 .21 
0 0 .38 .38 .25 .25 .37 .38 
.5 0 .21 .21 .23 .23 .56 .56 
1 0 .10 .10 .18 .18 .72 .72 
1.5 0 .04 .04 .12 .12 .83 .83 
2 0 .02 .02 .08 .08 .90 .90 
Estimated probabilities are from a multinomial logit model including the respondents' position on 
the X and Y axes as independent variables, and from a conditional logit model estimated with the 
actual distance between the voter and party. 
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multinomial logit cannot produce an estimate of the change in predicted probability 
relative to changes in positions of the parties because the position of the party is not 
included in the multinomial logit model ! 
APPENDIX C 
IIA Does Not Aggregate 
We want to be very clear on one potential point of confusion. All statements about 
IIA refer to relative probabilities of individual voters choosing parties .  It is possible for 
IIA to hold at the individual level, and for the aggregate claim that "a second conserva­
tive party will 'take' voters from an existing conservative party" to be true. This may 
appear to be a paradox, but it is really just a matter of arithmetic. We illustrate this with 
a simple example. Consider a spatial model where voters choose between parties based 
on the positions of the parties on one issue. The i1" voter 's  utility for the /" party is 
simply given by: 
[28] 
where x; is the i1" voter 's  position, Cj is the j'h party's  position, and £ij is a random 
disturbance term with an extreme value distribution. Assume we initially have two 
parties :  Liberal (L) at -1 and Conservative (C) at 1 .  Now assume we have a five person 
electorate with voters at: -2, -.5,  0, .25, and .75 . Table B3 gives the probability they 
will vote for each of the two parties in a two-party race in columns 2 and 3. The esti­
mate of the aggregate vote-share for each party would be computed by taking the mean 
of the probabilities over all five voters. This gives relative vote-shares of .46 and .54, 
for the Conservatives and the Liberals respectively. Now add a third party: the Right­
Moderates (M) at .5 .  The probabilities of each voter choosing any of the three parties in 
a three way race are given in columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 6. If one looks at the ratio of 
Table B3. Voter 's Shares and Individual Probabilities: 
IIA Does Not Aggregate 
Probabilities From Probabilities From 
Voters Two Cand Race Three Cand Race 
Position Pcl { C,L} PLl { C,L} Pcl { C,L,M} PLl { C,L,M} PMl { C,L,M} 
-2 .00 1.00 .00 .99 .01 
-.5 .12 .88 .08 .62 .29 
0 .50 .50 .24 .24 .51 
.25 .73 .27 .33 .12 .55 
.75 .95 .05 .49 .02 .49 
Mean .46 .54 .23 .40 .37 
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P;Ll { L, C}/P;cl {L, C} and compares it to P;Ll { L, C,M}IP;cl {L, C,M} for any respondent, 
they are equal. However, if one looks at the ratio of the means of P;L to P;c across the 
two different hypothetical elections they are different. In the first race the Conservatives 
are predicted to have 46% of the two way vote . In the three way race the Conservatives 
would only have 37% (i .e . ,  .23/( .23 + .40)) of the two way vote between the Conser­
vatives and Liberals .  Thus, consistent with our intuition, the entry of the Right­
Moderates-a second right party-takes more votes from the Conservatives than 
from the Liberals .  
APPENDIX D 
Simulation Methods for Estimating Multinomial Probit Models 
A number of different methods for simulating probabilities for the multinomial 
probit model have been advanced: the frequency simulator (Lerman and Manski 198 1 ), 
a kernel-smoothed frequency simulator (McFadden 1989), the method of simulated 
moments (McFadden 1989; Pakes and Pollard 1989), and simulated maximum likeli­
hood (Albright, Lerman, and Manski 1977; Lerman and Manski 198 1 ) .  However, these 
probability simulation techniques have been shown to be generally inferior to the recur­
sive probability simulator (known in the literature as the GHK simulator) developed in 
a series of more recent papers (Geweke 199 1 ;  Geweke, Keane, and Runkle 1994; 
Hajivassiliou and McFadden 1990; Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Rudd 1992; Keane 
1994) . Accordingly we used the GHK simulator to estimate the models presented in 
Tables 8 and 9, and in this appendix we describe how this recursive probability simula­
tor works . Similar discussions of the GHK simulator appear in Geweke, Keane, and 
Runkle ( 1 994) and Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Rudd ( 1 992) . 
We begin by defining a random utility function for voter i over each party j, where 
) =  1 ,  . . .  , J: 
[29) 
where xij is a vector of characteristics of party j relative to voter i, a; is a vector of char­
acteristics unique to the individual i, and e is a random disturbance. This is identical to 
the setup described in the body of the paper for conditional logit and multinomial 
probit. The disturbance terms are assumed to have a multivariate normal distribution, 
with mean zero and covariance matrix, l:. 
If we stack the model by parties, Equation 29 can be rewritten as : 
[30) 
where U; = (Un ,  . . .  , Uu)'. Finally, instead of working directly with this model, we 
utilize a differenced model where all utilities are normalized relative to the last choice: 
[3 1 )  
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CUu - Uu )  
where u; i s  a J X 1 vector with Vt = I and e; has a multivariate 
(aJ - 2ap + a.7 )2 
normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix L*, and U� = 0. 
From here, the probabilities of choosing each alternative for the individual voter are 
easy to specify (see Alvarez and Nagler 1995 for derivation of these probabilities for the 
three choice case) . However, in this form the multinomial probit model requires the 
numerical solution of J - 1 dimensional integrals to evaluate these choice probabilities; 
thus in the relatively simple three choice example, two dimensional integrals must be 
evaluated. Despite the fact that Hausman and Wise ( 1978) demonstrated that some 
additional transformations can reduce the dimensionality of the integrals to J - 2, the 
computational costs of evaluating high dimensional multivariate integrals have kept the 
multinomial probit model from being widely used in the literature. 
This is exactly the problem solved by the various probability simulators . The prob­
ability simulator of interest to us here, the GHK simulator, simply simulates the choice 
probabilities rather than explicitly evaluating the integrals .  The insight which drives the 
GHK probability simulator is that the choice probabilities of the multinomial probit 
model can be translated into a series of conditional probabilities which can be simulated 
recursively (Geweke 199 1 ;  Hajivassiliou and McFadden 1990; Keane 1992, 1994). 
Again, GHK is not a substitute for traditional maximum likelihood; rather GHK simply 
refers to a technique for computing the probabilities required to produce the maximum 
likelihood estimates. We show here how the GHK probability simulator works, by 
showing the details for computing the probability that the voter picks the fh party, 
which is based on the random utility function from Equation 3 1 .  
Now we define some notation for the derivation of the probability simulator (we will 
suppress the subscript i for ease of exposition) .  First, we write: 
[32] 
for k =  1, . . .  , J. Recall that the Jlh U;� = 0, which implies e� = 0. Now it is useful to 
define two sets of (J - 1) x 1 vectors : 
uj = cu( ,  . . . , uf_1 , uf+1 , .  • •  , uj )' 
'j _ 'j 'j 'j 'j 1 e - e1 , • • •  , ej_1 , ej+i ' · · · , e1 ) 
[33] 
For the voter to choose choice j, we require that all elements of Uj be less than or 
equal to zero, since party j is the choice of t�e voter u; -;: Uj :5: 0 '</ k. 
The distribution of £j will be IIDN(O, I:J ). Now if A1 is the lower triangular 
Cholesky factorization of i:J ,  and we define n = (v 1 , . • .  , v j-l ' v j+I , .  . .  , v J )' where n is 
a (J - 1) x 1 vector of independent standard normal random variables, then £j can be 
expressed as Ajv . Next, define Uf as a function of the ns, Uf (v i , . . .  , v� ), when the 
random variables n1 through nP are fixed at a draw (v{ , . . .  , vp for p :5: k. Notice that • .  
when p = k this is a value, but when p < k it is a random variable that depends upon l:1 • 
The l superscript is used to indicate that we repeat these draws of v} for M trials.  Thus 
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if we have five choices, and we are looking at the probabili�y of choosing choice 3 , and 
we want to do 50 trials, we draw four independent normal variables (n 1 ,  n2, n4, n5) ,  50 
times. 
Now GHK proceeds by drawing v, which is easy to do since they are independent 
and normally distributed. The v are drawn until the following criteria are satisfied: 
(1) Draw vi such that U/ (v{ ) < 0. 
(j - 1) Draw v�_1 such that U}_1 (vi , . . . , V�+l ) < 0. 
(j) Skip vj . 
(j + 1) Draw v�+l such that U}+1 (v{ , . . .  , v�_1 ) < 0. 
(J - 1) Draw v�_1 such that U}_1 (v{ , .  . . ,  v�+l • . . . , v�_1 ) < 0. 
[34) 
Using these draws, we can now write down the probability that the voter chooses the 
fh party: 
M j-1 
P(jj�* , 'tf*, 1:*, X*, A*) = � L /P(Uf < 0) x II P[U£ (v{ , . . . ,  vL1 ) < OJ [35) 
l=l k=2 
� l l l X P[Uj+1 (v1 , .  . .  , Vj_1 ) < 0] 
J 
x II P[UJ (vf , .  . . ,  v}_1 , v}+1 , .  . .  , vL1 ) < O]). 
k=j+2 
This is a straightforward calculation and enables us to estimate the MNP model for any 
reasonable number of choices. The GHK simulator has two important properties. First, 
it is unbiased and is smooth in the model parameters (Geweke, Keane, and Runkle 
1994 ) . But second, as is seen in the derivation we have just presented, it requires the 
evaluation of only univariate integrals and draws from univariate truncatea normal 
distributions. This second property is where the GHK simulator obtains the computa­
tional advantages over other probability simulators and certainly over the direct numeri­
cal evaluation of multivariate integrals .  
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